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The Effect Of Knowledge Gain On Capital Punishment: A Partial Test Of The Marshall
Hypothesis
Alexander Abel Savon
ABSTRACT

Justice Thurgood Marshall proposed a three-pronged postulate in his dissent in
1972 in the Furman v. Georgia (408 U.S. 238) Supreme Court case. The American
public is generally uninformed when it comes to the death penalty, and given information
a “great mass of citizens” would be against it, unless their underlying beliefs were rooted
in retribution (Furman v. Georgia, p. 363). These statements subsequently came to be
known as the Marshall Hypothesis, and were deemed testable by researchers.
This study examines the influence on death penalty opinion as a consequence of
participating in a college class on the death penalty. Students in the class, who were
either criminology majors or minors, were asked to take part in a questionnaire regarding
their attitudes toward capital punishment at the beginning and at the end of the semester.
Over the course of the class, students took part in a pre and post-test designed to measure
their knowledge of the death penalty. This study correlated the amount of knowledge
gained by each student with their respective death penalty attitudes.
Results indicated that many in the class had little knowledge of the practice,
application, and corollary effects of capital punishment. Those students who made the
greatest amount of knowledge gains also reported a reduction in support for capital
punishment. The acceptance of death penalty truths was not found to be related to a
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reduction in death penalty support. Further analysis, however, showed that those students
who accepted these death penalty “truths” were also able to disregard death penalty
“myths.” The present study concludes that support for the death penalty is directly
reduced through increased knowledge gain, and indirectly reduced through truth
acceptance as a function of death penalty “myth” abandonment.
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Chapter One
Introduction
American society is one consisting of a rich diversity of races, ethnic groups,
religions, strongly held beliefs, and opinions. Our First Amendment rights allow us the
privilege of expressing these opinions without the threat of governmental retribution.
The pluralism inherent to American culture enables a broad diversity of thought, leading
Americans to express opinions on a myriad of culturally salient topics. This becomes
important in the milieu of a democratic society, where public opinion helps shape law
and social policy. Perhaps one of our most pervasive issues is the topic of capital
punishment, which is the cause of much controversy and heated debate in this country.
The debate focuses on our Eighth Amendment protection against cruel and unusual
punishment, and what factors influence the legality of its application. “Cruel and
unusual,” written in the language of the constitution, does not contribute a concrete
meaning or a distinctive, actionable interpretation. The abstract nature of this wording
allows the Constitution to be inherently flexible amidst rapidly changing societal and
cultural norms. Alternatively, these open-ended concepts are also a weakness because
their ambiguity leads to imprecision and multiple interpretations.
Cruel and unusual punishment falls under the umbrella of public morality and
how it is defined by each successive generation. Public morality is the root of our legal
system and is reflected in a number of ways. Two prevailing concepts that define our
values and laws are the consensus and conflict model. The consensus model, being the
more legislative, is a representative of the will of the majority which may sometimes
1

subjugate the minority. The conflict model is more in line with public opinion which has
direct influence and is not a representation. Public morality can be gauged through
public opinion, and can therefore become a device for interpreting the meaning of the
Eighth Amendment with regard to capital punishment. In order to serve this function, the
standard of public opinion must be raised beyond beliefs and attitudes not rooted in
information germane to the death penalty. Relying on the conflict model (public opinion)
for constitutional interpretation has certain policy implications. Capital punishment can
be found to be cruel and unusual if an informed public deems it so.
What exactly constitutes cruel and unusual punishment however, has historically
been interpreted by the Supreme Court, which is the ultimate arbiter of the meaning of
the Constitution. Initially, it made numerous efforts to impose some type of analytical
definition. In other words, it has been difficult for the Supreme Court to formulate legal
opinions to be applied when a legislatively prescribed punishment is challenged as “cruel
and unusual” (Furman v. Georgia, 408 U.S. 238, 1972, p. 238). In Wilkerson v. Utah (99
U.S. 130, 1878) the Court first looked at the constitutionality of execution with the
example of the firing squad. The Court declared that shooting was not cruel and unusual
because it did not involve torture or unnecessary cruelty. The decision also set a
precedent that the punishment of death in itself was not cruel. Justice Clifford, in
delivering the opinion of the court, referring to Blackstone stated: “Punishments are
cruel when they involve torture or a lingering death; but the punishment of death is not
cruel within the meaning of that word as used in the constitution. It implies there is
something inhuman and barbarous,--something more than the mere extinguishment of life
(130 U.S. 135). The next form of execution scrutinized by the courts was electrocution in
2

1890 in In re Kemmler (136 U.S. 436). The Court decided that electrocution, although
unusual, was not cruel because it did not involve “torture or lingering death.” Death by
electrocution fit the criteria of unusual at the time, but was not considered cruel.
After the initial analytic approach, the courts pursued a normative stance in an
effort to bring meaning to the eighth amendment that was not drawn solely from the
provisions of the Constitution. The Constitution was drafted so that the public morality,
decency and fundamental values of the time provided its underlying basis. These values
are always changing, and in that spirit, the courts attempted to explore these values in a
series of cases beginning with Weems v. United States (217 U.S. 349, 1910). It was in
Weems v. United States (1910, p. 378) when the Court decided that the definition of cruel
and unusual punishment was dynamic and changing “as public opinion becomes
enlightened by a humane justice.” The definition was further elaborated in Trop v. Dulles
(365 U.S. 86, 1958, p. 101) when the Court stated the idea behind the Eighth Amendment
was tantamount to the “evolving standards of decency that mark the progress of a
maturing society.”
These evolving standards are an abstract concept that require tangible
measurement if they are to be applied to Eight Amendment interpretation. In Furman v.
Georgia (1972), the “evolving standards” were identified through several contemporary
devices. The first evidence of changing sentiment found in Furman came in the form of
decisions made by state legislatures. The decision of some states to abolish or authorize
capital punishment was viewed as an indicator as to whether the public accepts of rejects
it. The trend to minimize or restrict the use of capital punishment by state legislatures in
recent years showed that the public does not support it, according to Justice Marshall
3

(Furman v. Georgia, 1972). Justices Powell and Chief Justice Burger argued that
evidence that society approves of capital punishment can be found in the number of states
whose legislatures have kept capital punishment as an option (Furman v. Georgia, pp.
438-39, 384-85). The problem with using the legislative record as a measure of public
consensus lies in the fact that we live in a republic form of democracy in which
individuals do not directly influence policy. The influence of the way the public feels
about certain issues is said to be expressed at the ballot box on Election Day. We
empower our elected representatives to make laws and decisions based on the will of
their constituency. State legislators, however, may not operate in ideal form but may be
subject to political and partisan pressures which may skew direct objective
representation.
A second of indicator of these “evolving standards” can be found in the decisions
juries and prosecutors make in capital cases. Justice Brennan surmised that the
infrequency with which juries employ the death penalty (approximately a hundred or so
cases among thousands tried each year where the death penalty is available), is an
accurate indicator of the public conscience and “demonstrates that our society seriously
questions the appropriateness of this punishment today” (Furman v. Georgia, p. 299).
Justice Powell, in his dissent, stated that the infrequency with which the death penalty
was imposed was not a rejection of it, but rather an illustration of the particular care
needed to impose it (Furman v. Georgia, pp. 440-41). A flaw in the reliance on
prosecutorial and jury practices may be their sensitivity to outside influence. A highly
publicized trial may lead prosecutors to push for the death penalty in capital cases while
certain jurors may be excluded from service if they are against capital punishment.
4

Therefore, both legislative records and prosecutorial and/or jury decisions may be biased
representations of the public sentiment. The third index of our evolving standards can be
found through opinion polls taken through surveys or other instruments.
Public opinion, through polls taken, can be a flawed indicator of public sentiment
but it is, nonetheless, arguably the most accurate. Polling the general public is the only
measurement that is a direct representation of the will of the people and more in line with
the conflict model. Legislative record has an inherent lag which comes from the gap
between public sentiment and when new laws are enacted, whereas public opinion polls
are in real time. Public opinion also proffers unbiased data in that it is not affected by the
party politics of legislators and prosecutors. Again, although juries may be a sample of
the population, it is a relatively small sample that can be influenced by such things as
peremptory challenges. Albeit, the practice of polling the public is not perfect, but it has
been improved upon over the years with the advent of new social research methodologies
and advanced statistical techniques.
Justice Marshall had great reservations about public opinion, and found it
disturbing that public opinion polls showed that a majority of the American population
favored capital punishment. Justice Marshall believed that before public opinion can
become a factor in deciding the constitutionality of the Eighth Amendment it must be
held up to scrutiny and analysis. In Furman v. Georgia (1972), Justice Marshall stated
that for public opinion to be held up to a constitutional standard it had to be “informed”.
It was Justice Marshall’s contention that the majority of the American public had little to
no knowledge of the death penalty.

5

His second belief was that given information about the death penalty “the great
mass of citizens would conclude that the death penalty is immoral and therefore
unconstitutional” (Furman v. Georgia, p. 363). This belief goes to the reasons people
give for their support of capital punishment, and how these reasons qualify the legitimacy
of that support. Some reasons for supporting punishments in general include their
deterrent value, public safety issues, and their cost effectiveness. These general beliefs
rooted in deterrence, incapacitation, and cost as support for capital punishment are valid
reasons but the public may be uninformed about “true” effectiveness. Results are
unambiguous that capital punishment doesn’t deter (Bailey and Peterson, 1994), doesn’t
incapacitate more effectively than life sentences (Marquart and Sorensen, 1989), and is
not a cost savings (Garey, 1985). Public perception of the pervasiveness of rising crime
rates and the preponderance of murders may also influence this opinion. If public were to
become informed of these “truths” then according to Marshall they would change their
opinion.
Marshall’s third contention regarding the efficacy of public opinion involved the
necessity to gauge the moral basis behind that opinion. If the foundation of the public’s
feelings towards the death penalty relies on a belief in vengeance or “just desserts” then it
has no place in modern jurisprudence (Furman v. Georgia, p. 345). Marshall believed
that information and knowledge will have little impact on death penalty opinion if
retribution is the underlying factor of that opinion (Furman v. Georgia, p. 363). A belief
in vengeance for a particular grievance or wrong-doing can be an automatic emotional
reaction which runs counter to the logic and reasoning required for a measured response.
Retribution and vengeance are themes that permeate many facets of our popular culture
6

and perhaps even shape our beliefs and attitudes at the subconscious level. Marshall
deemed retribution as incompatible with decent and civilized conduct and that it is
precisely the baseness and harshness of retribution that the Eight Amendment was
designed to restrict (Furman v. Georgia, p. 345). This three-pronged postulate
consequently became known as the Marshall Hypothesis. What makes Justice Marshall’s
opinion in Furman unique is its ability to be tested empirically. It is the testability of
these hypotheses that have prompted researchers and abolitionists of the death penalty to
gauge its utility.
In previous attempts to test the Marshall Hypotheses researchers have exposed
study participants to various amounts and types of death penalty information. Initial
studies obtained pre- and post-test measures of death penalty attitudes but provided only
minimal death penalty information as the stimulus (Sarat & Vidmar, 1976; Vidmar &
Dittenhoffer, 1981; Ellsworth & Ross, 1983). These studies failed to measure how much
knowledge was gained and if it was retained at the time of the posttest. Subsequent
studies maintained the pre and posttest structure of these early research designs and
increased the stimulus to the setting of a classroom which allowed for increased exposure
and assimilation time (Bohm, 1989, 1990, 1994; Bohm, Clark, & Aveni, 1990, 1991;
Bohm & Vogel, 1991; Bohm, Maisto, & Vogel, 1993; Wright, Bohm, & Jamieson,
1995). But again knowledge levels, knowledge gains, and knowledge retention were not
measured. Instead these researchers assumed that an increase in knowledge level was
occurring in participants through exposure to reading materials and information presented
within a classroom setting. Simply exposing participants to information does not mean
that this information was retained nor does it not show how much was retained. These
7

past studies did not measure individual knowledge level of their participants or the
knowledge gained over time. Researchers may have assumed that the stimulus provided
between the pre and the posttest translated into knowledge being gained.
The second Marshall hypothesis (increased death penalty knowledge leading to a
reduction of death penalty support) must be measured in terms of knowledge gain and
attitude change in order to be comprehensive and show causation. There should be a
direct measure of the correlation between change in the amount of information gained
and change in death penalty opinion. Merely measuring attitudes on a pretest-posttest
basis without analyzing the underlying changes in the amount of knowledge gained is an
incomplete test of the second prong of the Marshall Hypothesis. The current study will
improve on previous studies (Sarat & Vidmar, 1976; Vidmar & Dittenhoffer, 1981;
Ellsworth & Ross, 1983; Bohm, 1989, 1990, 1994; Bohm et al., 1990, 1991, 1993; Bohm
& Vogel, 1991; Wright et al., 1995) by measuring information level and knowledge
gained over the course of the stimulus and will assess the effects of this change in level of
information on change if any, in death penalty opinion.

8

Chapter Two
Literature Review
Shortly after Marshall’s assertions in Furman, researchers began to conduct
studies to examine their empirical viability. In testing all of parts of the Marshall
hypothesis, the challenge is changing abstract concepts such as “informed” and
“knowledge of the death penalty” into operationalized variables. The difficulty lies in
determining what information and how much of it is necessary to achieve the status of
being “informed.” Is being an “informed” citizen tantamount to merely being exposed to
capital punishment related materials, or does it involve understanding the content of those
materials? If the latter, what level of understanding constitutes being “informed?” There
is the additional issue of measuring retributiveness. Since Justice Marshall believed that
death penalty support based on retributive reasoning was resistant to any new
information, increased knowledge must be analyzed in conjunction with measures of
retributiveness. The extant research literature testing the Marshall Hypothesis has largely
failed to address these issues.
A few of the first studies to address issue were conducted in the mid-seventies and
employed a pre-test/post-test design. A study done by Ellsworth and Ross (1983)
disseminated a questionnaire to five hundred people from the San Francisco Bay area in
1974. A high response rate was achieved by having their research assistants contact the
participants and set up appointments to collect the surveys instead of mailing them. What
Ellsworth and Ross were able to discern was that even though the majority of their
respondents had an unusually high education level, they still had little knowledge of the
9

application and consequences of capital punishment. More specifically, the respondents
that were pro death penalty rated deterrence as their strongest reason, yet when presented
with facts contradicting its efficacy, most would still maintain their beliefs (Ellsworth &
Ross, 1983). This statement reaffirms Marshall’s contention that retributive reasoning
supercedes knowledge and facts germane to the death penalty.
Sarat and Vidmar (1976) conducted a study utilizing interview data gathered
from a sample of 200 adult residents of Amherst, Massachusetts in 1975. A pretest was
administered which took the form of a questionnaire with various statements designed to
gauge attitudes towards capital punishment on a Likert scale. The stimulus introduced to
the participants were two fifteen-hundred word essays focusing on the utilitarian and
humanitarian aspects of capital punishment, which was followed by a post-test. Sarat and
Vidmar found that their subjects knew very little about the death penalty and when
exposed to information about the death penalty, a large percentage of people changed
their opinion to not favoring the death penalty. They also found that retributive beliefs
had a strong and significant relationship with support in terms of retaining previously
held opinions. Although these findings are impressive, there were several shortcomings
of the study that limit the generalizability of the results. The stimulus introduced
provides basic information at best, and certainly would not qualify as providing a wealth
of knowledge on the subject. The authors even concede that the conditions of the study
provided “only the most minimal opportunity for creating informed public opinion” (p.
195). For instance, the exposure to the provided stimulus amounts to the time it took for
each respondent to read two 1500 word essays and then take a post-test on their attitudes.
This brevity of exposure coupled with minimal time for adequate reflection does not meet
10

the criteria for retained “knowledge.” The study also fails to analyze the legitimacy of
retribution as a factor in formulating opinion and maintaining ignorance against relevant
facts and information. Both studies found a general reduction in support for the death
penalty but were unable to understand the reasoning behind the change and to what level
their respondents were “informed.”
Vidmar and Dittenhoffer (1981), in a Canadian study, also used a pre and posttest questionnaire but improved on the other studies by changing two things. They
exposed the participants to relevant information materials, but then coupled it with group
discussions and a longer period of time for reflection and assimilation. The idea behind
this approach was that active learning is more conducive to attitude change than passive
learning. The researchers were able to form a quasi-experimental group by paying the
subjects that participated in the readings and discussions a larger sum of money than the
control group which merely filled out the pre and post-tests. These improvements on
design allowed Vidmar and Dittenhoffer not only to replicate previous findings by
shifting certain cases from death penalty support to death penalty opposition, it also
produced a majority of opposition. Opinion in the experimental subjects changed from
33 percent opposing capital punishment to 71 percent (Vidmar & Dittenhoffer, 1981).
Despite its improvements, the study had some major shortcomings. Researchers had to
assume that the subjects in the experimental group actually read the assigned material and
brought up pertinent information in the group meetings. There were also no researchers
present in these group meetings, so there was no way of knowing what was talked about,
or if any subjects monopolized these discussions. Another major problem with the study
is its use of an extremely small (N=21) nonrandom sample. The study demonstrated the
11

need to improve sample size and increase the amount of information along with the time
needed to retain that information. The crucial component missing in these studies
appears to be the need to exert a greater amount of control over the circumstances. The
process by which an individual person perceives the information he or she has been given
still remains a mystery.
In a 1979 study, Lord, Ross, & Lepper attempt to illustrate some of the
dynamics of this process. In their study they identified that attitude polarization and
biased assimilation play a part in the way people process information. It is their
contention that people who hold strong opinions on complex social issues are likely to
examine relevant empirical evidence in a biased manner. A group of 151 undergraduates
were delineated as either “opponents” or “proponents” of the death penalty according to
their answers on a questionnaire. Lord and his colleagues discovered that when exposed
to the same empirical studies, the students assimilated the information in a biased manner
in accordance with their previously held beliefs. In other words, people who have a
strongly held opinion on a certain subject will take in information differentially,
disregarding conflicting evidence and placing greater emphasis on evidence consistent
with their beliefs, thereby polarizing their opinions (Lord et al., 1979; Ellsworth & Ross,
1983).
The effects of attitude polarization and other biases necessitate a change in the
time and manner in which information is imparted. The next era of tests of the Marshall
hypothesis, almost completely monopolized by Bohm and his colleagues, attempted to
address this issue (Bohm, 1989, 1990, 1994; Bohm et al., 1990, 1991, 1993; Wright et al.,
1995; Bohm & Vogel, 1991). These studies utilized a classroom setting and increased
12

the stimulus time to an entire semester instead of a questionnaire filled out in a few hours
(Bohm, 1989, 1990, 1994; Bohm et al., 1990, 1991, 1993, 1995; Bohm & Vogel, 1991).
Moreover, a classroom setting provides constant instructor supervision and more time for
the participants to take in and analyze information and incorporate it into their own
system of beliefs. Classroom settings generally met for 40 hours a semester and
classroom instruction was supplemented with videos on capital punishment, guest
speakers, classroom discussion and the use of Bedau’s The Death Penalty in America
(1982), (Bohm, 2003, p. 263). Opinions on the death penalty were disaggregated into
four questions because the general opinion question taken from poll data does not
accurately encompass the different degrees of support people may have (Bohm, 1989,
1990, 1994; Bohm et al., 1990, 1991, 1993, 1995; Bohm & Vogel, 1991). The first two
questions proffered scenarios in which the respondent decide if some or all people
convicted of first degree murder should be put to death, while the last two were more
direct and asked respondents to put themselves in the position of jury member or
executioner.
Bohm and associates’ measure of death penalty opinion along with the improved
experimental stimulus of a college classroom have led to a number of important findings.
With regard to the first question of whether all people convicted of first degree murder
should be put to death, the percentage increase in opposition went from 28.3 to 46.6
percent. Likewise, the percentage increase in opposition for some people convicted of
first degree murder went from 28 to 49.5 percent (Bohm et al., 1991). The third question
asked respondents to act as a member of a jury trial where the defendant, if found guilty,
would automatically be sentenced to death. The change in percentage of those subjects
13

who could not convict went from 22.5 to 34.4. When asked to act as executioner and
actually pull the lever themselves the percentage went from 47.2 to 49.6 percent who
could not pull the lever (Bohm et al., 1991). Though support for the death penalty may
decline after participants have been informed, the change in opinion was not great enough
to produce an opposition greater than 50 percent (Bohm, 1989; Bohm et al., 1991; Bohm
& Vogel, 1994).
Three factors were identified that were not affected by increased knowledge about
the death penalty. If revenge or retribution is the main reason for death penalty support,
then knowledge is not likely to effect much change because revenge is primarily an
emotional instead of an intellectual response (Bohm & Vogel, 1991; Bohm et al., 1993).
Increased knowledge would also not have an effect on death penalty attitudes if that
opinion is based on the incapacitation effect of the death penalty, because that effect is
simply irrefutable. Finally, increased knowledge of the death penalty as per the
deterrence argument will not affect attitudes because general deterrence is not a
particularly salient reason (Bohm et al., 1993). In fact, Bohm (1991) notes that in the
1991 Gallup poll, only 13 percent of respondents favoring capital punishment selected “it
is a deterrent” as a reason for their support. It was also determined that if subjects give
their opinion about the death penalty publicly, it may be more difficult to change their
positions (Bohm, 1990). The reason for this is that people committing publicly to an
opinion make those opinions more resistant to counter arguments and avoid thinking
about the implications of that opinion.
In a partial test of the Marshall hypothesis, Lambert & Clarke (2001) and
Clarke, Lambert & Whitt (2001), have focused on the idea of innocence and the effect it
14

has on people who maintain retribution as their main basis of support for the death
penalty. Lambert and Clarke maintain that “even the most staunch adherent of an eye for
an eye will want to get the right person’s eye” (2001, p. 337). Using a nonrandom
sample of 210 criminal justice students, Clarke et al. used a three-part survey consisting
of a pre-test, three essays, and a questionnaire to gauge attitudes on capital punishment.
The first section measured students’ knowledge on the death penalty by using a series of
statements based on a 5-point likert scale. The students were then asked to read three
essays which included an essay on control, one on deterrence and one providing the most
recent information on the frequency and probability of sentencing innocent individuals to
death. The final part of the survey measured the degree to which their attitudes changed
based on the exposure to each of the three essays. Clarke et al. found a small reduction in
support for the death penalty, but not enough to shift the level of support to one of
opposition. In fact, exposure to the “innocence” essay led to the largest degree in attitude
shift toward death penalty which was statistically significant. Lambert and Clarke (2001)
conducted a similar study with the only difference being a large sample (N=747). Their
results produced similar findings in that those students who read the “innocence” essay
had a larger reduction in support for the death penalty, but not enough to create a
majority. Some obvious problems with these two studies are their use of a nonrandom
sample in using only criminal justice students and the limited exposure time
(approximately 10-12 minutes). Along these same lines, a positive aspect of this study is
that researchers were able to produce a statistically significant shift in attitude using only
limited exposure time.
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The current study will utilize a college classroom as with the Bohm studies, but
extend the experimental stimulus to a full semester course. This study will also expand
on previous research by providing multiple measures of “knowledge.” In a few of the
Bohm studies, “knowledge” was operationalized as mere exposure to the death penalty
course/materials (Bohm, 1989, 1990; Bohm et al., 1990, 1991; Bohm & Vogel, 1991;
Wright et al., 1995). In others, a 14-item scale was used (Bohm et al., 1991), or a single
self-defined student assessment of knowledge item was utilized (Bohm et al., 1993;
Bohm and Vogel, 1991). In most of Bohm’s studies, attitudes toward the death penalty
are compared before and after exposure and/or between “experimental” and “control”
groups (Bohm, 1989, 1990; Bohm et al., 1990, 1991; Bohm & Vogel, 1991; Wright et al.,
1995). In others, “knowledge” levels are compared with death penalty opinions both at
the start and at the end of the course (Bohm et al., 1993; Bohm, 1994) or changes in
knowledge are examined but not correlated with death penalty support or change in that
support (Bohm et al., 1991). In fact, none of these studies have correlated the effects of
identified change in knowledge levels with any changes in death penalty attitudes and
beliefs which are necessary for a more complete test of the second of the three Marshall
hypotheses. The present study addresses this shortcoming.
Identifying changes in knowledge levels and correlating them with changes in
death penalty attitudes is the most ideal way to test Marshall’s assertions in the second
prong of his hypothesis. The degree of change in an individual’s knowledge level gain is
the most salient way to identify whether or not a person is truly “informed.” For instance,
the degree in knowledge change should have a significant impact on overall death penalty
support according to Marshall’s second hypothesis. Additionally, the tendency to
16

disregard death penalty “myths” and accept death penalty “truths” should also be
proportionate to the change in knowledge. Other correlations such as death penalty
support with increased “truth” acceptance and “myth” abandonment could also be a
function of the overall amount of knowledge gained.
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Chapter Three
Methodology
The research design utilized for this study consisted of a one-group pretestposttest design similar to the studies conducted by Bohm (1989, 1990) and his
colleagues, (Bohm & Vogel, 1991, 1994; Bohm et al., 1990, 1991, 1993). The sample
for this study consisted of 70 undergraduate Criminology students of a large, urban
university in West-central Florida enrolled in a special topics course on the death penalty
during the Summer of 2003. All students enrolled in this course were Criminology
majors (69) or minors (1). Fifty-six percent of the subjects were female, 60 percent were
white, 23 percent black, 16 percent hispanic, and 1 percent “other.” The mean age of
these subjects was 23.1 (SD = 5.75; range = 19-65). Fifty-seven percent were seniors and
43 percent juniors (all special topics courses in the Criminology major are restricted to
upper-division students). The self-reported grade point average of the students was 2.94
(SD = 0.43; range 2.00 - 3.81; a minimum 2.00 g.p.a is required for both the major and
minor in Criminology) and 58 percent indicated having previous exposure to information
on capital punishment presented in previous courses. The profile of these subjects is
nearly identical to that of the major as a whole. Similar to Bohm’s studies, the course
met for 3 ½ hours a day, twice a week, for six weeks (42 classroom hours, with some
brief breaks). The assigned text for the course was Bohm’s Deathquest II (2003). Bohm
and his colleagues used The Death Penalty in America, (1982) by Hugo Adam Bedau. I
believe that the Bohm text supercedes the Bedau book for our purposes because it is more
current, and, in our opinion, both more comprehensive and better suited for
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undergraduates. In addition to the text, other sources of death penalty information
included daily lectures and discussions, a required packet of readings containing 22
reprints of original empirical studies relating to death penalty issues and four redacted
U.S. Supreme Court rulings (Furman v. Georgia, 1972; Gregg v. Georgia, 428 U.S. 153,
1976; McClesky v. Kemp, 481 U.S. 279, 1987; and Witherspoon v. Illinois, 391 U.S. 510,
1968), and several invited presentations and guest speakers. Topics covered in the course
included the history of the death penalty in the United States, with special emphasis on its
legal history as per the Supreme Court. These topics were also very similar to Bohm’s
course description. Also covered in the course were the issues of public opinion,
theological and philosophical approaches to the issue of capital punishment, and
retribution. The exiguous deterrent and incapacitation effects of the death penalty, the
issues of innocence and miscarriages of justice in the administration of the death penalty,
and questions of arbitrariness and vagary were also discussed. Finally, the questions of
racial/ethnic-, economic-, gender-, and age-based disparities in capital sentencing, and the
relative economic cost of capital punishment were addressed.
The instructor was forthright in presenting his own views of the death penalty, but
strongly emphasized the importance for the students to form their own, informed
opinions. To the best of his abilities, all sides of an argument were presented on issues
without a preference for any position. The instructor would often take the role of “devil’s
advocate” to provoke thought and discussion. Finally, it was made aware to the students
that their grades and evaluations were by no means dependent on their beliefs and how
they were reported. The course, text, instructor, and other course materials were all quite
favorably evaluated by the students; in fact, several of the students offered written
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comments about the quality of the course and the large amount information they felt they
had learned (91.4 percent indicated that they strongly agreed with the statement:
“Overall, I learned a great deal from this course,” the remaining 8.6 percent agreed with
this statement). Several indicated that the course had caused them to change their views
regarding capital punishment (58.6 percent less supportive/more strongly opposed; 5.7
percent less opposed/more strongly in favor) while others indicated that their opinions
had not changed (35.7 percent), but nearly all of the written comments showed that the
students felt the course was provocative and caused them to be more introspective. We
interpret these comments as validation that the “experimental stimulus” was sufficient in
both quantity and quality of exposure (c.f. Lord et al., 1979; Sarat & Vidmar, 1976;
Vidmar & Dittenhoffer, 1981).
On the first day of classes, after a brief course introduction, the students were
asked to complete a brief questionnaire regarding their views on capital punishment and
to take a “knowledge” pretest. The pretest was comprised of 50 randomly selected
multiple-choice and true/false items derived from the test bank developed for the Bohm
text. Although the pretest was graded it did not count as part of the students’ final course
grades. These same 50 items comprised the “knowledge” post-test and were given as
part of the final exam. The scores on this exam did count as 25 percent of the students’
final course grades.
The subjects’ attitudes toward capital punishment were measured before and after
the stimulus using a single item. The first asked “Which of the following statements best
describes your position toward the death penalty for all persons convicted of first-degree
murder?” Response categories ranged from 1 = very strongly opposed to 7 = very
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strongly in favor (high score = high support). The questionnaires also included a series of
eleven statements displaying “truths” and “myths” about capital punishment where
students were asked to indicate the degree they agreed/disagreed (1 = strongly disagree; 4
= strongly agree). Four of these statements represented death penalty “truths:” (1) There
is strong reason to believe that similar offenders convicted of murder often receive
dissimilar sentences; that is, some are sentenced to death while others are sentenced to an
alternative less than death,” (2) “Poor people who commit murder are more likely to be
sentenced to death than rich people,” (3) “A black person is more likely to receive the
death penalty than a white person for the same crime,” and (4) “Those who murder white
victims are more likely to receive the death penalty than those who murder blacks.”
These four items were combined into a collective death penalty “truths” scale (high
scores = high truth).
The remaining seven items represented death penalty “myths:” (1) “The murder
rate usually drops in the weeks following a well-publicized execution,” (2) “The murder
rate is lower in states with the death penalty,” (3) “The best available research findings
consistently reveal unambiguous evidence that capital punishment reduces homicide,” (4)
“The death penalty is more effective than life imprisonment without possibility of parole
(LWOP) in protecting society from the future actions of those who have already
committed capital crimes,” (5) “Only legally relevant criteria distinguish murderers
sentenced to death from those sentenced to a punishment less than death,” (6) “There is
no evidence to support the claim that innocent persons have ever been sentenced to death
and executed in error,” and (7) “Capital punishment is less expensive than alternative
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punishments such as life imprisonment without opportunity for parole (LWOP).” These
seven items were combined into a collective death penalty “myths” scale.
Change in knowledge attitudes and beliefs was operationalized by three different
methods. The first method consists of simple differencing the pre-test score from the
post-test or vice versa, depending on the direction the change should occur. For example,
an increase in knowledge level should have a positive association with truth acceptance
but have a negative association with myth holding and death penalty support if it is
concurrent with Marshall’s second hypothesis. The second method, percent of change,
takes the difference from the pretest and posttest scores or posttest from the pretest and
divides it by the original pretest score. The third method measures the change in relative
gains achieved by each participant. Relative gain refers to the difference of the pretestposttest scores divided by the maximum total possible points between the original pretest
score and the total possible score that could have been achieved. These are measurable
gains specific to each participant based on their scoring differentials between pre and post
test. Each student, in effect, creates for him/herself a range of possible improvement
available to them. A student scoring a 90 percent on the pretest can only gain a
maximum of 10 total points assuming they score perfectly on the posttest (See Figure 1).
A student scoring 50 percent on the pretest has a better opportunity to attain a large
amount of total gain points by scoring well on the posttest. Assuming the second student
receives an 84 percent on their posttest, the difference (34 points) would be divided by
the total points possible (50) in order to receive this student’s relative gain (0.68).
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Figure 1. An Example of Relative Gains
Pretest

Post-test

Difference Points Possible

Relative Gain

Student 1

90

100

10

10

1.00

Student 2

50

84

34

50

0.68

Although there is a disparity in the amount of total points gained between the two
students, student 1 was able to achieve a relative gain of 100 percent while student 2 only
achieved 68 percent. The first two measures described would show the second student as
having the greatest amount of knowledge gained, which albeit true, fails to show the
context of that gain. The measure of relative gain addresses this limitation. Each item
was constructed in such a way that a negative association between the change in
knowledge measure and change in the death penalty attitude and belief measure would
show support for the second Marshall hypothesis. That is, the increases in knowledge
should be associated with significant decreases in death penalty support. Increases in
knowledge should also have a positive association with truth acceptance and a subsequent
negative association with myth holding. Pearson product-moment correlation
coefficients are used to assess the nature of the relationship between knowledge gained
and changes in truth acceptance, myth holding, and death penalty support.
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Chapter Four
Results
Table 1 presents zero-order product moment correlations between measures of
knowledge gain and the measures of change in death penalty support. The net difference
between pretest and posttest score as a measure of knowledge gain shows no relationship
across all three measures of change in death penalty support. Likewise, the correlations
between percent of change in knowledge and the three death penalty support measures
also failed to attain statistical significance. However, correlations between relative gains
in knowledge are statistically significant across all three measures of death penalty
support. Therefore, the effect of knowledge gained on change in death penalty support
achieves statistical significance only when it is measured as relative gains. Those
students which showed the greatest relative gains in knowledge also reported the greatest
decreases in death penalty support consistent with the second Marshall hypothesis.

Table 1. Pearson’s Zero-Order Product Moment Correlation between Knowledge
Gains and Change in Death Penalty Support (N=70)

Death Penalty Support
Difference

Percent of Change

Relative Gain

Difference

-.107

-.125

-.125

Percent of Change

-.002

-.003

-.003

Relative Gain

-.220*

-.265*

-.265*

Knowledge Gains

* p < .05 (one-tailed t-test)
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When the correlations between knowledge gains and truth acceptance are
examined (Table 2) a different pattern of findings emerge. The net difference between
pretest and posttest score as a measure of knowledge gain is significantly correlated with
the posttest difference in truth acceptance, but not with the percent of change or relative
gains measures. The only other significant relationships emerge when correlating relative
gains made in knowledge with both the net difference and the relative gains measures of
truth acceptance. These relationships seem to suggest that knowledge gains may have
lead to greater death penalty truth acceptance. Acceptance of death penalty truths is likely
to be a major component in death penalty opposition. As such, these findings supplement
the argument that increases in relative knowledge gain will decrease death penalty
support through truth acceptance, albeit indirectly.

Table 2. Pearson’s Zero-Order Product Moment Correlation between Knowledge
Gains and Change in Truth Acceptance (N=70)

Truth Acceptance
Difference

Percent of Change

Relative Gain

Difference

.198*

.184

.219

Percent of Change

.106

.096

.093

Relative Gain

.227*

.158

.340*

Knowledge Gains

* p < .05 (one-tailed t-test)
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Table 3 presents zero-order product moment correlations between measures of
knowledge gain and the measures of change in myth holding. None of the measures
analyzed produced statistically significant correlations. This suggests that there is no
direct relationship between gains in knowledge and the abandonment of death penalty
myths. This is not to assume however, that there is not an indirect relationship. Table 4,
which presents the correlations between truth acceptance and myth holding, reports that
the correlation between the percent of change in truth acceptance and the relative
reduction in myth holding is statistically significant. Thus, increased acceptance of death
penalty truths may lead to the abandonment of certain death penalty myths. In other
words, those students which showed the greatest percent of change in truth acceptance
also reported the greatest relative decreases in myth holding. Accepting death penalty
truths challenges the viability of death penalty myths, which are conducive to death
penalty support.

Table 3. Pearson’s Zero-Order Product Moment Correlation between Knowledge
Gains and Change in Myth Holding (N=70)

Myth Holding
Difference

Percent of Change

Relative Gain

Difference

-.089

-.135

-.022

Percent of Change

-.068

-.086

-.018

Relative Gain

-.067

-.075

-.042

Knowledge Gains

* p < .05 (one-tailed t-test)
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Table 4. Pearson’s Zero-Order Product Moment Correlation between Truth
Acceptance and Change in Myth Holding (N=70)

Myth Holding
Truth Acceptance

Difference

Percent of Change

Relative Gain

Difference

-.156

-.144

-.160

Percent of Change

-.181

-.159

-.201*

Relative Gain

-.113

-.128

-.069

* p < .05 (one-tailed t-test)

The zero-order product moment correlations between measures of truth
acceptance and measures of change in death penalty support are displayed in Table 5. No
statistically significant correlations were found between any of these measures.
However, a number of the correlations between measures of reduced myth holding and
measures of change in death penalty support (as shown in Table 6) attain statistical
significance. The correlation between net differences in myth holding and all three
measures of change in death penalty support attain statistical significance. Likewise, the
net differences in death penalty support are also significantly related to all three measures
of change in myth holding. Thus, those students who most abandoned death penalty
myths also reported the greatest decreases in death penalty support. As was mentioned
before, the reduction in death penalty myth holding is directly related to the gains made
in truth acceptance. These finding suggest that a complex relationship exists between
truth acceptance and reduced death penalty support when mediated by death penalty myth
holding.
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Table 5. Pearson’s Zero-Order Product Moment Correlation between Truth
Acceptance and Change in Death Penalty Support (N=70)

Death Penalty Support
Truth Acceptance

Difference

Percent of Change

Relative Gain

Difference

-.069

-.030

-.030

Percent of Change

-.056

-.018

-.018

Relative Gain

-.016

-.028

-.028

* p < .05 (one-tailed t-test)

Table 6. Pearson’s Zero-Order Product Moment Correlation between Myth
Holding and Change in Death Penalty Support (N=70)

Death Penalty Support
Difference

Percent of Change

Relative Gain

Difference

.275*

.224*

.224*

Percent of Change

.237*

.192

.192

Relative Gain

.270*

.194

.194

Myth Holding

* p < .05 (one-tailed t-test)

In summation, these findings reported in Tables 1-6 suggest that gains in
knowledge have both direct and indirect relationships with decreases in death penalty
support. For example, Figure 2 shows a direct relationship in that an increase in
knowledge leads to a decrease in death penalty support. The indirect relationship appears
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to be a function of truth acceptance, myth holding and death penalty support also
illustrated in Figure 2.1. Knowledge gains are directly related to increased acceptance of
death penalty truths. In turn, increased acceptance of death penalty truths leads to a
decrease in adhering to death penalty myths. Finally, the abandoning of death penalty
myths leads to decreased support for the death penalty. These direct and indirect
relationships between knowledge gains and the reduction of death penalty support give
credence to the second prong of the Marshall Hypothesis.

Figure 2. Direct and Indirect Effects of Knowledge Gain on Decreased Support for
Capital Punishment

(-)
Knowledge

Death Penalty Support
(+)

Truth
Acceptance

(+)

(-)
Myth
Holding

The two variables having the greatest direct impact on change in death penalty
support according to Tables 1 through 6 are knowledge gain and myth abandonment. In
order to better understand some of the dynamic behind these effects, a profile analysis is
employed to examine the characteristics of those students who reported the highest
knowledge gains and the lowest myth abandonment. That is, the demographic
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characteristics of those participants that displayed the greatest amount of knowledge gain
will be evaluated to determine what factors specific to the group or individual facilitated
a change in attitude. Transversely, those students who were found to be most resistant in
maintaining their death penalty myths will also be analyzed. To do so, the profile of
those students from the top 20 percent of knowledge gain is described (Table 7).
Similarly, a profile of those students from the bottom 20 percent of myth holding is also
described (Table 8).
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Table 7. A Profile Analysis of People with The Strongest Knowledge Gains:
Relative Gain Greater than or Equal to .80 (n=16)

Variable

Mean

Standard Deviation

Minimum

Maximum

Age

22.94

3.53

19.0

34.0

Sex

0.56

0.51

0.0

1.0

Black

6%

0.25

0.0

1.0

Hispanic

0.13

0.34

0.0

1.0

G.P.A

3.17

0.45

2.2

3.81

Retributiveness

8.38

2.47

4.0

13.0

Difference in
truth acceptance

3.63

3.84

-2.0

12.0

Difference in
myth holding

4.13

4.92

-5.0

14.0

Death penalty
support (pretest)

4.81

1.11

2.0

7.0

Death penalty
support (posttest) 3.50

1.86

1.0

7.0

Difference in DP
Support

1.31

1.40

0

4.0

% of change in
DP Support

0.28

0.31

0

0.80

Relative gain in
DP Support

0.28

0.31

0

0.80
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The participants most likely to hold on to previously held myths about the death
penalty had a mean age of 23.7 and made up 53 percent of the class. The range in age
went from 19 years old to 65. These students had a mean grade point average of 2.90
with a minimum of 2.0 and a maximum of 3.78. The mean difference in truth acceptance
was 1.89 with a standard deviation of 3.74. These students had a mean score of 4.97 for
the death penalty support variable on the pretest and a mean score of 4.41 on the posttest.
The difference between the pretest and posttest scores was 0.57.
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Table 8. A Profile Analysis of Most Resistant Myth Holders: Percent of Change
Less than or Equal to .20 (n=37)

Variable

Mean

Standard Deviation

Minimum

Maximum

Age

23.70

7.64

19.0

65.0

Sex

0.56

0.50

0.0

1.0

Black

24 %

0.43

0.0

1.0

Hispanic

0.11

0.31

0.0

1.0

G.P.A

2.90

0.45

2.0

3.78

Retributiveness

8.41

2.90

4.0

15.0

Difference in
truth acceptance

1.89

3.74

-3.0

12.0

Difference in
knowledge gain

44.78

15.84

18.0

80.0

Relative
knowledge gain

0.70

0.13

0.38

0.96

Death penalty
support (pretest)

4.97

1.54

1.0

7.0

Death penalty
support (posttest) 4.41

2.13

1.0

7.0

Difference in DP
Support

0.57

1.56

-2.0

4.0

0.10

0.38

-1.0

0.80

0.10

0.38

-1.0

0.80

% of change in
DP Support
Relative gain in
DP Support
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The participants achieving the greatest amount of knowledge gains had a mean
age of 22.9 and made up 23 percent of the class. The range in age went from 19 years old
to 34. These students had a mean grade point average of 3.17 with a minimum of 2.2 and
a maximum of 3.81. The mean difference in truth acceptance was 3.63 with a standard
deviation of 3.84. These students had a mean score of 4.81 for the death penalty support
variable on the pretest and a mean score of 3.50 on the posttest, for a difference of 1.31.
These numbers indicate that there were significant differences along with some
similarities between the two groups. Grade point average, for example, displayed very
similar low and high range values that only varied by one or two tenths of a point. The
difference becomes evident when comparing the two mean scores which are 2.90 for the
stanch myth holders versus 3.17 for the greatest knowledge gain students. This is a
significant, though not surprising difference in that those students who made the greatest
knowledge gains would also have the higher grade point average. It is also not surprising
to see that the highest myth holding students had a mean score of 1.89 in truth acceptance
on the seven point scale as opposed to a score of 3.63 for the highest knowledge gain
students. Those participants most likely to hold on to death penalty myths should also be
more resilient in accepting death penalty truths. Finally, the most relevant observation
when looking at pre and posttest differences is the degree of change in death penalty
support. Both the myth holding and knowledge gain students report very similar pretest
scores of 4.97 and 4.81, respectively. At the time of the posttest, however, the students
with the greatest knowledge gains show a mean score of 3.50 in death penalty support
while their myth holding counterparts displayed a 4.41, indicating only a minimal
reduction in support. A mean difference of 0.57 for the myth holders and 1.31 for the
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knowledge gains students shows a significant difference in death penalty support. This is
also not a surprising conclusion when considering the results of Tables 1-6 and of Figure
2 which illustrates the direct and indirect effect of knowledge gain and myth holding on
death penalty support.
These results have considerable relevance when we relate them to the contentions
made in the Marshall Hypothesis, specifically the second prong. Justice Marshall’s belief
that with increased information and knowledge gains the “great mass of citizens would
conclude that the death penalty is immoral and therefore unconstitutional” has a
significant bearing on the aforementioned results. Although a 1.31 reduction in death
penalty support by the highest knowledge gains students is not tantamount to a total
rejection of the death penalty, it does illustrate a definite trend. Those students with the
highest grade point averages that were able to accept death penalty truths and abandon
death penalty myths consequently made the greatest amount of knowledge gains. This
result certainly gives credibility to the belief that the more knowledgeable one becomes
on capital punishment, the more likely one is to reject its practice.
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Chapter Five
Summary and Conclusions
This study sought to examine whether or not a relationship exists between support
for capital punishment and knowledge gained on the subject. The reason for conducting
this type of research follows the notion that the American public is usually uninformed on
a variety of different topics which they also profess to have strong opinions on. The
Marshall Hypothesis serves as an excellent springboard for this research and has become
the impetus for many studies preceding this one. The second prong of this hypothesis
states that if the American public were to become informed about the practice,
application, and corollary effects of capital punishment, they would be against it. The
other two prongs offer that the majority of Americans are uninformed about the death
penalty and that information would have no effect on their beliefs if that belief was
rooted in retribution. This study focused on the second prong of that hypothesis and
attempted to identify the dynamics behind how information becomes knowledge, how
much of that knowledge was gained, and if increased knowledge reduced death penalty
support.
This study replicated the classroom setting used by Bohm and his associates and
used a one-group pretest-posttest design (Bohm, 1989, 1990; Bohm & Vogel, 1991;
Bohm et al., 1990, 1991, 1993). The group consisted of 70 undergraduates who were
either criminology majors or minors enrolled in a special topics course on the death
penalty during the Summer of 2003. The class consisted of an assigned text for the
course, daily lectures and class discussions, required reading packets, and several invited
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presentations and guest speakers. Students were given a “knowledge” pretest at the
beginning and end of the class which consisted of 50 random questions related to capital
punishment. This test was supplemented with a survey used to gauge students’ attitudes
toward capital punishment which consisted of a 7-point likert scale. The survey also
included eleven statements that represented “truths” and “myths” about the death penalty
which were measured using a 4-point scale. The main focus of the study was change in
knowledge and amount of knowledge gained, which was analyzed using simple
differencing, percent of change and relative gains. The nature of the relationship between
knowledge gained and changes in truth acceptance, myth holding, and death penalty
support were assessed by using Pearson product-moment correlation coefficients.
Results of the study included a number of key findings which displayed some
direct and indirect associations between increased knowledge and death penalty support.
In terms of direct knowledge gains on death penalty support, a key finding was that those
students with the greatest relative gains in knowledge reported the greatest decreases in
death penalty support. In this case knowledge level did have the predicted effect on death
penalty support, but only as a function of the specific relative gains made. Knowledge
gain was also measured against the degree to which the students held on to death penalty
myths. Although no association was found that achieved any statistical significance,
further analysis revealed an indirect correlation between knowledge gains, truth
acceptance, and the effect it had on myth abandonment. Acceptance of death penalty
“truths” was found to be directly related to an increase in knowledge gain, which
subsequently lead to a reduction in students holding on to their death penalty “myths.”
Truth acceptance alone had no effect on reduced death penalty support unless it was also
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correlated with myth holding, revealing a complex indirect relationship. In both cases
increased knowledge gains lead to a reduction in death penalty support either directly or
indirectly when mediated by truth acceptance and myth holding. These key findings
seem to suggest that the second prong of the Marshall Hypothesis maintains relevance
even if its suppositions are more multifaceted than originally surmised.
Some other findings, the result of a demographic analysis between the most
stringent myth holders and people with the highest knowledge gains, illustrated specific
attributes associated with each of these groups. For example, the students who made the
greatest gains in knowledge also had a higher mean grade point average than their
counterparts. These same students were able to attain a higher level of truth acceptance
and refute death penalty myths. An interesting finding was that both groups detailed
similar pretest scores on death penalty support, but after the stimulus, the highest
knowledge gain students had a much more significant reduction in death penalty support
than students who held onto their myths.
There were several limitations to this study which should be addressed in future
research on the Marshall Hypothesis. The sample used was not a random sample as it
was comprised of criminal justice students who opted to take the special topics course on
capital punishment. There was no control group and there were no controls for gender,
race, grade point average, and retributiveness. The statistical analysis was incomplete
because there was no use of residual change scores. Valid generalizations of these
findings cannot be conclusively drawn due to the fact that the level of correlation was
relatively low and statistical significance achieved was never higher than a 0.340.
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The relevance of this research is evident today because capital punishment in the
United States remains a hot button issue. Proponents and opponents of the death penalty
stringently maintain their beliefs and justify them with a number of religious, academic,
and social rationales. The justifications behind the reasoning of death penalty proponents
were directly challenged through increased information and discussion in the setting of a
university classroom. If Justice Marshall’s contentions are to have any legitimacy in the
ongoing debate over capital punishment in this country, then they should be tested
completely. As researchers achieve a more cogent and comprehensive analysis of this
postulate, the closer we will come in deciding its true relevance.
The research conducted in this study was not meant to be a simple replication
exercise of the previous tests of the Marshall Hypothesis. I believe that there was a
significant contribution to be made to the extant literature in that no one had previously
studied change in knowledge and the effect it had on death penalty support. Increased
information, and therefore knowledge, is an integral component to the second prong of
the Marshall Hypothesis, and should be measured to see if it was actually achieved.
Previous tests have relied on exposure to information on the death penalty, and although
time and level of exposure were increased, the retention and level of increase were never
analyzed. This study provided multiple measures of knowledge and attempted to
measure that change in knowledge to see if was retained at the end of the class and what
effect this change had on support for capital punishment. Although it is beyond the scope
of this study to evaluate the epistemological foundation of knowledge gain, it does prove
that increased knowledge can change opinion and beliefs. The data show that analyzing
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the dynamics of knowledge gain is now the proper focus of the debate over the ability to
create an “informed electorate.”
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